High Art Definition High Art Vs Low Art Definition
Mary Cassatt. Mother and Kid. Oil on canvas, 1890. Wichita Art Museum.
Picture show yet from Crimes and Misdemeanors (1989).
Volume encompass of Ayn Rand'south The Fountainhead.
Book cover of Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities.
Beethoven, composer.
Incubus, culling rock band.
Above I have listed a few images of artworks and artists that I have mentioned in the final paper I wrote for my Philosophy of Art seminar, in which I gave my take on the topic of loftier versus low art. If I asked a group of people to sort the above artists/works into the categories of high and depression art, I recollect the categories would expect pretty similar amid everyone. Incubus, the movie Crimes and Misdemeanors, and Ayn Rand's novel would all probably fall in the low fine art category, while Cassatt, Beethoven, and Dickens would all be placed in the loftier art category. It is natural for us to suspect that if we wanted to feel smarter for an afternoon, we are much more likely to spend that day looking at Cassatt'due south artwork, listening to Beethoven, and reading Dickens than we are to have Woody Allen movie marathon, listen to Incubus, and read Ayn Rand. Only why practice we naturally presume that 1 category is like healthy brain food while the other is mental junk food, consumed only for pleasure? Why have nosotros decided that Cassatt's condition as a painter, a adult female artist, and as an Impressionist whose work nosotros find in fine art museum's is better for us than Woody Allen, or (for a more than comparative example) graffiti or tattoo fine art? In my paper, I discuss the reasons that philosophers take given over the past several centuries to not but defend the need for a distinction between high and low fine art, just why high fine art is better for us than depression fine art. Then I volition also argue against these reasons, positing mainly that the loftier/low fine art distinction serves cipher, and that it is in fact harmful to culture and community because information technology preserves a sense of snobbery and elitism among those who engage in the traditionally designated high art forms over and against those who engage in traditionally low art forms.
High Art versus Low Art: A Distinction That Harms More Than It Helps
Introduction
I have a low opinion of some artworks that are typically considered worthy enough to be exhibited in museums, which Richard Shusterman claims, in his assay of the history of how we regard entertainment and pleasure, "accept replaced churches as the place where i visits on the weekend for cultural edification." [1] For example, I find Mary Cassatt to accept generally produced terrible artwork, in the sense that she accomplished nix that other impressionists she admired, such as Monet and Degas, had not already done, and furthermore, numerous other artists with like styles and motivations did what she did so much better. I personally observe the art of the filmmaker Woody Allen, whose film Crimes and Misdemeanors (1989) stands out as an peculiarly fantabulous example of Allen's gift, to be infinitely more unique, well-crafted, and thought-provoking than annihilation Cassatt ever created. I would also say that I take always regarded Ayn Rand novels much more highly than annihilation past Charles Dickens or Shakespeare, although it is far rarer to find an institution dedicated to the report of literature that would have Rand equally as seriously as Dickens or Shakespeare, allow alone more seriously. Am I wrong in having this stance? Should I have Cassatt, Dickens and Shakespeare more seriously and with deeper appreciation than I do Allen and Rand?
It is no secret, whether in everyday life or in the study of philosophy, that there are notions of "high" versus "depression" fine art, or "fine art" versus "popular art" or popular culture. Cassatt, Dickens and Shakespeare would certainly be placed in the high or fine art category more often than Woody Allen or Ayn Rand would. It means something to usa whether we call something a work of loftier or fine fine art rather than depression or pop fine art. Loftier usually refers to what John A. Fisher calls "paradigms of fine art: Village, Eliot'southward The Waste Country, Beethoven's Eroica, Swan Lake, the paintings of Cézanne—indeed, museum paintings generally, classical music generally, poetry more often than not and so forth." [two] Fisher suggests that a work is chosen high fine art depending on whether its grade is traditionally or historically considered to exist high fine art. When we refrain from giving a work the status of high fine art, Fisher reasons, "it is natural to think of the term that contrasts with high fine art as denoting objects that are not actually fine art." Because of this, the high or depression fine art stardom "approximates" the art or non-art distinction. [three]
Why the High-Low Fine art Distinction Has the Result of Creating a Bureaucracy of Forms
While Fisher claims that we should not assume that the high-depression stardom is the aforementioned every bit distinguishing betwixt adept and bad fine art, [four] the fact that this distinction functions essentially like the art—non-art distinction does in fact suggest that there is a hierarchy of forms of expression, with the high forms being art and thus better for united states of america to pursue while the low forms are not art and therefore a distraction at best, a pernicious tool at worst. In his assay of how philosophers have treated entertainment, Shusterman points out that the ranking of art forms has been a common practise past philosophers since Plato, who at the extreme terminate on his views of art idea that mimetic arts provided "corruptive pleasures of amusement through imitations of the real that pretend to truth and wisdom but lack the cognitive legitimacy of true noesis" which the art of philosophy has. [5] In more than modern times, philosophers such as Theodor Adorno gave specific requirements for what true art, or the all-time art, does for humanity, which in Adorno'due south case would be "to provide a disquisitional perspective on gild; its goal should exist liberation from the social, economic, and political realities. To that terminate, information technology should be costless from commercial pressures." [six] Here Adorno draws a abrupt line betwixt art and not-art, suggesting, in the words of Noël Carroll, that "genuine art is an attempt to free itself from the social status in which it finds itself." [7] The very fact that we tend to call up the person who reads Pride and Prejudice at the beach is more sophisticated, more intelligent, or has meliorate taste than the person who reads The Da Vinci Code demonstrates that there is an implicit association of high art (or even only art) with superiority and low fine art (or non-art) with inferiority. In short, whether we telephone call a piece of work art or not matters because it affects how much we value it and the way in which nosotros appreciate information technology.
Why the Loftier-Low Stardom Matters, and Why It Is Wrong
Calling something fine art implies that it is a product of our culture, and that information technology is something worth studying in lodge to larn something well-nigh our civilization. If aliens from some other planet decided they were going to visit Globe merely wanted to get acquainted with its inhabitants before visiting, our Earth ambassadors would surely advise them that one of the best ways they could acquire about u.s.a. is past studying our fine art. If these aliens only studied the paintings in museums, classical music, the "great" works of literature, and other forms that are normally considered either high fine art or the only true forms of fine art, they would not but develop an incomplete picture of human life, but the picture show would also be wholly inaccurate. They would demand to report a much broader, less specific array of works in club to get a better agreement of humanity, including telly, rock music, and other forms that are usually considered either depression fine art or non art at all. In response to this, ane might say that merely because these aliens should study all of these things, it does not follow that they should all be called art. Responding to this counterargument would likely dissolve into an apologetics for why these forms are simply every bit good as high forms. Merely the question to which I do not see an objective [eight] answer is why they should non be called works of art, no affair how awful they might be in certain cases. Even more than and then, I cannot discover a reason to distinguish on the ground of course or genre between loftier fine art and low art.
It is perplexing to me that nosotros have decided that certain forms, or forms which fulfill narrowly specific aims, are the but ones which can be considered high art or art at all. When information technology comes to defining art, it is of import to accept some boundary as to where art ends and products of culture begin. Information technology is just every bit important, notwithstanding, not to create boundaries that are excessively limiting.
Just past upholding a loftier-low stardom in art, we open ourselves up to defending sure works as high art and certain works as depression art on bases that are ultimately of personal opinion. Ted Cohen, when request himself why it is important for him to affirm or deny that a work is an artwork, realized that "When I experience similar insisting or denying that something is art it is because I wish to insist on or resist the idea that the thing is to exist taken seriously, that there is kind of obligation to recognize the thing as a significant particular in my life." [9] Cohen has recognized that what he calls art matters personally to him, and his nomenclature of works as artworks is non equally objective an analysis as some philosophers present it to exist in their claims to define art. This recognition Cohen has humbly observed is a realization I would invite Adorno to accept well-nigh his own definition of what fine art should be and how it should serve us.
As stated before, Adorno claims that art should be critical of society and that is the main part it serves. His view clearly comes from a Marxist orientation, and yet he makes universal claims about what art should do in a earth that is not necessarily inherently Marxist. What if an artist does not want to be disquisitional of gild, or not be critical in the way that Adorno is critical of gild? His idea of what art should exist seems to derive likewise much from his personal political goals, which decide what he desires out of his ain experience of art. By asserting his personal preference for what the best art accomplishes, Adorno denies the multiple functions that art tin can serve for others, some of which could certainly be opposed to his. It seems overly exclusive and limiting that no matter how much an artist thinks seriously about what he creates, no thing how much he says through the work he produces, that work is not as valuable as another creative person's work just because his work is not disquisitional of guild while the other'southward piece of work is, if we follow Adorno'south theory.
While in Adorno'south instance his dismissal of low or popular art forms appears to be overly motivated by personal political goals, other philosophers have warned against the perils of low fine art with reasons that make sweeping generalizations about art forms and exercise not stand to scrutiny. In his book about mass fine art, Carroll discusses 4 general arguments that philosophers of aesthetics take used to support not merely a stardom between art and mass fine art, only as well to stigmatize mass art as a subversive forcefulness in gild which decays our minds and distracts u.s.a. from engaging with high art, the merely kind of art that is nourishing for u.s.. I will focus on the offset two arguments Carroll discusses, namely massification and passivity, in this newspaper. Carroll, in his give-and-take of mass fine art, distinguishes mass art from popular art as a unique historical phenomenon created by the industrial era's unprecedented capabilities of mass production. [x] Popular fine art, by dissimilarity, is a term that is harder to define because what has been considered popular art in one century becomes fine fine art in another.
I will use the term low art as Carroll defines mass art because low art, in today's world, is mass art. Broadly speaking, all of the forms by and large considered to be low fine art tin exist and are reproduced and widely distributed, one of the conditions that Carroll considers necessary to classify a work as a mass artwork. The other necessary status for something to be called a mass artwork, as Carroll argues, is that the "artwork is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (for case, its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and fifty-fifty its content) toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, near on start contact, for the largest number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences." [xi] The idea that mass fine art is more accessible both logistically and intellectually is one of the characteristics theorists accept used to distinguish loftier art from depression art, and so there is no conflict with using low fine art the way Carroll uses mass art on the ground of this condition, either.
The massification argument, which Carroll introduces equally having its origins in Dwight MacDonald's work, "is symptomatic of a number of the recurrent biases exhibited past American cultural critics through most of the twentieth century with respect to mass art." [12] I believe it is this bias which causes us to sneer (or feel pressured to sneer if we want to announced intellectual and sophisticated) at those who do not appreciate high art in the way nosotros might recall they should. Massification describes depression art's trait of existence mass produced and meant for mass consumption. The fact that depression art is hands reproducible marks its impersonal and alienating nature compared to high art's intimate expression of a single artist's vision. The reason that depression art is and then impersonal and indistinctive is because it is impurely motivated by the desire to make large profits on it, which tin can simply exist accomplished if the art is homogenous plenty to be able to exist consumed by the largest and near various amount of people possible.
This argument makes several assumptions that these qualities of low art are necessarily negative. The fact that low fine art tin can often exist mass produced is a trait that, in sure means, gives it an advantage over loftier art forms that cannot exist easily reproduced, such as painting or sculpture. Accessibility to art is a topical political issue in the discussion of education and unequal access to educational resources. Many cities are trying harder than ever to make their high art scene as accessible as depression art. Increased accessibility was one of the reasons given by the Barnes Foundation for why it should move its art collection to Center Metropolis Philadelphia despite the brake in Albert Barnes' volition that the art could non leave the Merion building. For many people, especially those located in rural areas where the nearest art institutions are hundreds of miles away, loftier art's lack of accessibility is a detriment rather than an asset. If nosotros want more people to appreciate fine art and have an arts education, why would we remain in the mindset that accessibility is to exist avoided? Lack of accessibility also serves to highlight socioeconomic inequality, where one's knowledge of fine art and the number of museums and concert halls they tin boast to take visited is directly correlated to the ability that their wealth gives them to travel easily. Similarly, a disdain for low fine art forms whose creation was motivated partly or solely past money also ignores the societal benefits of this trait of low fine art. In an economic system where the job marketplace is increasingly competitive, wouldn't it be a skillful matter that the arts industry is profitable enough to contribute to chore cosmos? And if careers in the arts tin can offer a way to brand a living to those who are passionate most art, doesn't that only assistance them to spend more of their time engaging with art and to provide opportunities for others to do so?
The second argument made against depression art as identified by Carroll, which he calls passivity, is that depression fine art makes few intellectual or emotional demands on u.s.a.. Different loftier art, which requires united states to have more education in social club to sympathise and appreciate it, depression art can exist consumed and appreciated without any try. It cannot be denied that high art does require educational activity in order to be fully appreciated. As an art history major, I know that I enjoy and appreciate visual art now much more than I did before I began to report art history. I also know that it is possible I might appreciate high literature more if I took more English classes. Merely it is also dismissive to suggest that we do non demand an education to fully appreciate low art forms. While I had always enjoyed Crimes and Misdemeanors, I appreciated it in a much deeper, more thoughtful manner when I studied information technology alongside Kant's Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals in a course I took on political theory. Information technology would exist much more difficult to fully appreciate the television show American Dad! if one did not understand the American political arrangement upon which the bear witness draws for much of its political satire. Furthermore, loftier and low art forms tin benefit from a mutual understanding and appreciation of each other, a view that I am supporting in my choice to study Edward Hopper aslope the film American Beauty (1999) for my Swarthmore Higher Honors thesis. Whether an art class, loftier or low, makes demands on us is ultimately entirely up to u.s.. We can decide for ourselves whether we desire to study art history so that we can have a nuanced perspective on a painting, or whether nosotros want to study Indian culture in society to more fully capeesh Bollywood films. Whether an artwork is high or low, we are the ones who determine how easy and passive our experience will be with them, not the artwork.
Many philosophers have extolled the positive event that art can have for us, sometimes using these effects to contrast loftier art with low art and claim that low fine art does not have the same positive effects on us which high fine art provides. Cohen nearly compellingly suggested, for case [13] , that fine art requires u.s.a. to engage in metaphors of personal identification, a skill which nosotros use in our attempts to empathize and appreciate others. What is perhaps most discouraging about some philosophers' insistence that we stay away from depression art and must pay as much attending as possible to high art is that such a focus fails to exist pragmatic. It will ultimately neglect because it stubbornly clings to an idealistic vision of how people should act and feel.
To demonstrate this bespeak, allow u.s.a. accept for a moment that Beethoven is ameliorate than Incubus, or that Milton is better than Shel Silverstein. Now imagine you lot have a friend who personally does not experience the benefits of a life filled with Beethoven and Milton in the ways that theorists who champion high art over low art promise we would. Instead, this friend claims that he has overall become a improve, more thoughtful and insightful person because of his time spent with Incubus and Silverstein instead of Beethoven and Milton. What would we tell this friend, peculiarly if for usa nosotros accept the taste for Beethoven and Milton over Incubus and Silverstein? If nosotros insist on upholding the distinction between high and depression fine art and likewise maintain that loftier art is amend than low art, nosotros would have to say that this friend of ours is mistaken. He must need more education or more exposure to high art. Or he needs to approach or exist taught high art in a dissimilar way that would make him realize the error of his ways. Unless we can bear witness that high fine art serves a singled-out purpose that low fine art cannot serve, which would require us to deny our friend's claim that low art did for him what only high art can supposedly do, there is no reason that, equally Cohen puts it in his essay "Liking What's Proficient: Why Should We?", it is better to like better things. [14] Just information technology seems awfully egotistical and presumptive to think that nosotros know better than someone else enough to claim that we tin deny their experience of fine art and assert that we know amend than him to which art it is expert for us to pay the most attention.
To support the idea that we tin can deny private experiences if they practise non correctly interpret art, nosotros might turn to Kant. Kant's theory of the beautiful posits that all humans have the cerebral faculties of imagination and understanding, and that these faculties, along with a disinterested attitude in which no preferences influence our judgment, are what assist u.s.a. to determine that a work of art is cute. Since nosotros all determine beauty through the same process and without partiality, genuine judgments of dazzler, and of fine art, will have intersubjective validity. This means that nosotros volition come to our judgments of beauty independently and apart, but we will so observe that our judgments are in universal agreement with everyone who used this process.
Kant'southward theory of intersubjective validity is hard to decisively disprove, because we will never know whether we are truly making a disinterested judgment. But if we gathered one hundred people together and asked everyone to make a disinterested judgment of dazzler nigh a detail work, what if all but one person disagreed? It is not implausible to say there will always be disagreement in the area of gustatory modality. No matter what the artwork is, there will ever be at to the lowest degree i person on Earth that you lot'll observe who disagrees about whether the artwork in question is beautiful. But for that one person who disagrees with everyone, does that one person'due south stance simply not matter? Is his experience and stance denied validity just because he did not agree with the bulk of the group? The answer to this seems to come downwards to how much value i puts in the collective versus the private. And perhaps for those who hold collectivist values over individualist ones, I might never be able to convince them that information technology is wrong to ignore that single person'due south view even when it comes in the face of ninety-nine unanimously opposing views. But if one values the individual at all, surely the thought that we can deny i person's feel does not sit well. And for that thing, why do nosotros think that nosotros have the potency or the qualifications to privilege our gustatory modality over someone else's?
How Exercise We Care for Fine art Without the High-Low Stardom?
At this signal, I have defended why there should be no distinction between loftier and depression fine art, but I have not explained why this distinction, even if we turn down to discard it, should not be the aforementioned as the stardom betwixt art and non-art. It may seem every bit if the difference betwixt broadening the definition of fine art and while assuasive that some art is adept and some is bad, every bit I am arguing nosotros should, compared to simply calling the skilful things fine art and the bad things non-art, seems nonexistent. Because whether you believe the movies to exist non-art or really bad fine art, you lot will notwithstanding not accept them seriously, or at least you volition still non value them. The fact that yous do not take them seriously is fine past itself. Merely it is important that yous recognize that moving picture, nonetheless negatively you may call back of them, is still fine art [15] , because to do so is to admit that you lot accept your own biases, your perspective is uniquely your own, and that y'all are not the absolute authority of sense of taste or aesthetic judgment, no matter how qualified you might think you are. By virtue of your individuality, you are subjective [sixteen] , and considering you practise not take all experiences and cannot know everything, you lot cannot claim to know truth for a fact. You cannot claim to know that truly, a moving picture is non a work of art, or that David Copperfield is an splendid work of art. Nosotros should all admit that our views can be nothing more than opinions and that information technology is unfair to guess one person to have better taste simply because of their opinions, preferences, or expertise.
Another point I recall I should clarify is that there is a difference between calling an art form good or bad and calling it high or depression. As I accept said, I am happy with critics decrying television as foul art and praising painting as wonderful art. The reason that this is non the same as calling television low art and painting high art is considering the means that philosophy has used those distinctions in the past, for reasons which I have discussed earlier, have given the forms which fall nether high or low art inherent characteristics which are inherently skilful or bad. Merely not all of the forms which have typically been considered loftier or low have had these characteristics, and these characteristics are not necessarily skilful or bad, as I have tried to demonstrate above. And even if we believed they did, we should recognize that our beliefs as such are not absolute truths about these forms, equally the high-art stardom implies they are.
So with this in mind, how do we distinguish art from non-fine art? I would say that something is art as long as it is expressive, that the artist made it with the intention of expressing something that is truthful for them. How do nosotros distinguish art from other expressive works, such as academic papers or newspaper articles? I recall the difference here is that artworks cannot merely report what is observed or researched. What the work expresses has to be something beyond a single event or situation, an idea that the artist arrived at independently which could not be replicated past someone else. In the case of academic papers, articles, advertisements, or other expressive works, with enough research and expertise, someone could reasonably create on his ain what the other person created on his own.
The other feature that distinguishes artworks from regular works is that artworks do not directly, plain express what they desire to limited. An academic paper or commodity tells the reader directly what it is trying to express, whereas art forms do not. Literature creates an entire earth with characters and stories to express an underlying message. Paintings utilize pigment and through that paint create compositions, figures, and color patterns, amidst other elements, to give the viewer a certain message. The same can be said of goggle box, motion-picture show, dance, music, sculpture, and other forms which practice not land outright what they want to limited. Art uses a medium in tandem with abstract, intangible devices (such every bit composition, light, rhythm, dialogue, allegory, etc.) to limited something through the medium and its devices, rather than just stating, "in plain English language," what information technology wants to express. Certain works of art exercise a better job of expressing something than others, or some may practice information technology more cleverly than others. But how well an artwork does its job does non justify determining whether it is even an artwork on that footing.
Conclusion
My main focus in this paper has been to fight against the hierarchical nature of the high-low fine art distinction. Although I have introduced my manner of distinguishing between art and non-art, I realize that this is a brief introduction and would require elaboration in order to develop information technology into a substantive theory. Instead of extending this paper into a much longer work to attain that need, I will instead offer a lovely idea that Cohen presents on how we should engage with others as we engage with art. [17] If we are no longer going to spend time trying to convince others that form A is high art while form B is low fine art or not-art, how should we form communities of artistic engagement with different art forms? And if we are no longer going to exist disquisitional of ourselves or others apropos the graphic symbol of our gustatory modality, how should nosotros recall nearly our taste? Cohen begins to answer these questions by imagining two circles of taste. In the eye of one circle lies the Marriage of Figaro, with people of diverse groups who love it, such equally Cohen himself, fans of opera, or fans of Mozart, situated around the circle's center. The other circle Cohen imagines is one in which he is the center, and all the artworks he loves environs him. Cohen asks himself, what practice all the people who beloved the Union of Figaro have in mutual? And what exercise all of the works that Cohen loves take in mutual?
Cohen's answer is that these people and these works have goose egg in common. We exercise not have anything in common with others who beloved similar things, nor practice the things we dear take anything in common with each other. In Cohen's
Unabashed, romantic annunciation: each piece of work, each object of appreciation and affection is unique, and equally unique are those of us who are the appreciators, and, in addition, those bonds that link united states to our loves may as well exist unique, or nearly. It is critical to appreciate this uniqueness, and the way to do this is to do away with, one by one, all the temptations to think we are non unique, that nosotros are only like one another. In doing this, nosotros have a run a risk to discover two things we admittedly demand to know, namely only how much nosotros are indeed like one another, and how much nosotros are not. [eighteen]
Instead of focusing on how to exist better than other people by liking better art than others, an aim which the high-depression distinction pressures usa towards, I think we might spend our fourth dimension more fruitfully if we permit ourselves to be fascinated and perplexed by the way that life stories shape ane person's love of Pollock and another person's beloved of the band My Morning Jacket. And it is when we enter dialogues of taste and critique with curiosity and openness rather than a competitive attitude tinged with a sense of superiority that nosotros volition have the promise for a much broader, and more vibrant aesthetic customs of date.
[1] Richard Shusterman, "Entertainment: A Question for Aesthetics," British Journal of Aesthetics 43, no. 3 (2003): 302.
[2] John A. Fisher, "Loftier Art Versus Low Art," in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York: Routledge, 2005), 527.
[3] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid., 528.
[v] Shusterman, 291.
[6] Fisher, 533.
[seven] Noël Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art (Oxford: Clarendon Printing, 1998), 72.
[8] By objective as I utilize the give-and-take here I mean without being ultimately subjected to personal desires or preferences.
[9] Ted Cohen, "High and Low Thinking about High and Depression Art," The Periodical of Aesthetics and Fine art Criticism 51, no. 2 (1993): 154.
[10] Carroll, 185.
[11] Ibid., 196.
[12] Ibid., 16.
[13] That my description of Cohen's idea lies side by side to my ascertainment that philosophers have assorted high art with low fine art based on its uniquely positive effects is not meant to imply that Cohen participates in that line of idea. Cohen, whose view of high versus low fine art Fisher describes equally "pluralistic hierarchicalism" (531), believed in the high versus low art distinction, only did non believe that either group was superior to the other.
[xiv] Cohen, "Liking What's Good: Why Should We?" in Philosophy and the Estimation of Pop Culture, eds. William Irwin and Jorge J.Eastward. Gracia (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 118.
[15] But of course y'all are entitled to think that flick is categorically terrible art.
[sixteen] By subjective I mean that you are inextricably tied to your item partialities equally adamant past your life experiences. I do not believe as Kant does that nosotros can make truly disinterested, impartial judgments.
[17] Cohen, in Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Civilisation, 126-129.
[18] Ibid., 128.
Works Cited
Carroll, Noël. A Philosophy of Mass Art. Oxford: Clarendon Printing, 1998.
Cohen, Ted. "High and Low Thinking about High and Low Art." The Journal of Aesthetics and Fine art Criticism 51, no. 2 (1993): 151-156.
—. "Liking What's Good: Why Should Nosotros?" in Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop
Civilisation, edited by William Irwin and Jorge J. E. Gracia, 117-130. New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2007.
Fisher, John A. "High Art Versus Low Fine art," in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, edited past Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, 527-540. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Shusterman, Richard. "Amusement: A Question for Aesthetics." British Periodical of Aesthetics 43, no. iii (2003): 289-307.
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